I think what actually works best is local-level individual targeting of key leadership nodes.
You know as well as I do that counterinsurgency is a very nuanced type of military operation.
We've got to ensure that the quality and the capability of these forces will be good enough to withstand the challenges that the insurgents and the terrorists will present to the new Iraqi government.
Undoubtedly, there are members of the former regime that are cooperating in some fashion and then there are extremists that are within Iraq that are cooperating with them.
So, these political activities will create friction in and of themselves, and in this environment of friction there'll be additional violence.
As far as Zarqawi is concerned, there is a network of extremists; it's not just Zarqawi.
Well, the hardest thing to do, as we know from our own experience on 9/11 is protect everything all the time.
But I am satisfied that the information that we have that this is the work of Zarqawi, is accurate.
But all that having been said, you can't, in a city of a million people like Karbala, or 5 million like Baghdad, you can't be in all places at all times.
Our forces will not be on the sidelines.
Clearly the Secretary of Defense, my boss, would like nothing better than to get Osama bin Laden and to get... to ensure the complete defeat of al-Qaida, because we know that al-Qaida is planning operations against the United States even as we speak here.
But the truth of the matter is that there is there is an opportunity for them to participate in the economic and political future of the country and certainly in the security life of the country.
Morale is good; troops are confident; leaders are capable.
Everybody needs to understand that I learned Arabic from the United States Army as a second language. I never spoke it at home.
But my Arabic is pretty good. It's good enough to have conversations with people, to understand what they say, to understand what they're feeling.
I don't believe Iran is a suicide state.
