Saddam Hussein was undoubtedly a brutal dictator who had attacked Iraq's neighbours, repressed and killed many of his own people, and was in violation of obligations imposed by the U.N. Security Council.
The judgements about the severity of the threat posed by Iraq's weapons of a mass destruction - WMD - were presented with a certainty that was not justified.
We have concluded that the U.K. chose to join the invasion of Iraq before the peaceful options for disarmament had been exhausted. Military action at that time was not a last resort.
We do not agree that hindsight is required. The risks of internal strife in Iraq, active Iranian pursuit of its interests, regional instability, and al-Qaeda activity in Iraq, were each explicitly identified before the invasion.
The U.K.'s relationship with the U.S. has proved strong enough over time to bear the weight of honest disagreement. It does not require unconditional support where our interests or judgements differ.
Despite explicit warnings, the consequences of the invasion were underestimated.
Planning and preparations for Iraq after Saddam Hussein were wholly inadequate.
We have found that the Ministry of Defence was slow in responding to the threat of improvised explosive devices and that delays in providing adequate medium-weight protected patrol vehicles should not have been tolerated.
In practice, the U.K.'s most consistent strategic objective in relation to Iraq was to reduce the level of its deployed forces.
We are not a court - not a judge or jury at work - but we've tried to apply the highest possible standards of rigorous analysis to the evidence where we make a criticism.
The people of Iraq have suffered greatly.
The scale of the U.K. effort in post-conflict Iraq never matched the scale of the challenge.
The U.K. military role in Iraq ended a very long way from success.
Blair overestimated his ability to influence U.S. decisions on Iraq.
